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CHESAPEAKE BAY OYSTERS:
SPECIES

LEGAL THESES ON EXOTIC

Thomas B. Lewis* and Garrett Power**

Introduction
The Chesapeake Bay oyster culture is traditional.

In

both Maryland and Virginia most oysters are taken by
hand from natural oyster bars.

Existing laws limit

access to the residents of the respective states, and
discourage new technologies and mariculture.
A recent Supreme Court decision, Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., may change this culture.

It~•

primary impact may be a highly mobile interstate
oyster fleet free to search out productive oyster
grounds without regard for state boundaries; its
secondary impact may be renewed interest in private
oyster leases, mariculture, and the introduction of
new species of oysters.
The paper which follows examines these prospects.

*Associate, Rich and Janney
Ahnapolis, Maryland, U.S.A.·
(formerly Staff Attorney, Chesapeake Bay Foundation)
**Professor
· University of Maryland School of Law
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A.
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Part I
CHESAPEAKE BAY OYSTER LAWS
The Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery is divided into
three regulatory regions.

Virginia waters are regu-

lated exclusively by that state.

The Potomac River,

the south bank of which forms the Maryland-Virginia
border, is regulated by the Potomac River Fisheries
•
Commission created by a compact between the two
1
states.
Other Maryland waters are regulated exclusively by that state.

The Chesapeake oyster industry

remains strongly rooted in its cultural and historical
2
origins, but despite its reluctance to copy the innovative methods used to boost oyster production in
other regions and in other countries, the natural
advantages of this Bay enable the two states to produce a major portion of the country's oyster harvest.
The regulation of the Chesapeake oyster industry
begins with the demarcation of public oyster bars.
These areas, with a natural capability for oyster
growing, are regulated in both states as a common
fishery within which private leases are forbidden. 3
This basic division restricts the development of
private oyster culture to those remaining areas which
are generally less likely to favor such attempts.

In

Virginia, the original designation of natural oyster
bars was made in 1892 in the Baylor survey, and these
designations, as modified by subsequent statutes, are
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deemed to be conclusive in Virginia courts on the ques-

4

tion of the limits of the natural oyster beds.
The
original survey of Maryland's natural oyster beds was
completed in 1912. 5 That survey can be modified by
either of two procedures.

The Maryland Department of

Natural Resources is authorized to reclassify submerged
lands to reflect the actual character of the bottom,
after public hearings and possible court appeals.

6

Also, whenever anyone applies for a lease of an area
not classified as a natural oyster bar, his application
may be defeated by a protest supported by evidence that
"the public has resorted to the bar for a livelihood,
whether continuously or at intervals, during any oyster
season within five years prior to the filing of an
application. 117 If a protest succeeds, the designat.ion
of natural oyster bars must be enlarged accordingly. 8 \

V

Private oyster leases account for a far greater
proportion of the area harvested in Virginia than Maryland.

Virginia has 243,000 acres of public oyster
grounds and over 100,000 acres in leases. 9 Maryland,

on the other hand, has some 350,000 acres of public
10
bars and about 9,000 acres in private leases.
Stated
another way, private leases in Virginia occupy over
ten times the area of Maryland's private grounds.
Part of this difference may be attributable to less
favorable regulation of private leasing in Maryland.
Maryland limits the total acreage which may be
leased to a single individual to 500 acres in the

/
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main body of the Bay, and 30 acres in tributaries. 11
Virginia allows one leaseholder to accumulate up to
5,000 acres in the Bay and up to 3,000 acres in tributaries.12

Maryland does not permit leases to corpora-

tions; corporate leaseholders are welcome in Virginia: 3
Virginia charges an annual rent of one dollar and fify
cents per acre, an amount set by statute, whereas Maryland charges slightly more at present, two dollars per
acre per year.

14 Each state allows twenty year terms,

but only in Virginia is the lease automatically
renewed.

15 Power dredging, by far the most efficient

harvesting method, is permitted on private grounds
Monday through Saturday in Virginia, while Marylanders
may dredge under power only two days per week. 16
Virginia prohibits exports of seed oysters if the
Commissioner of Marine Resources determines that there
is only enough for Virginia planters. 17 Maryland
leaseholders receive no similar protection:

the state

must place the first one million bushels of seed
oysters taken in its repletion program on public bars,
and can sell no more than half of what remains to private lessees.

18 As if these restrictions and the fre-

~uent protests against lease applications were not
enough to discourage a prospective oyster farmer,
Maryland has enacted an outright prohibition on leas,',.ing in five major tidewater counties a~d in parts of
S1"xth • 19

a

: ,On the Potomac River, oyster leasing is prohibited
.

/

under the 1958 Potomac River Compact.

20

This restric-

tion can only be lifted by the action of both states.
The public oyster bars of the Chesapeake are regulated as three distinct fisheries.

Each area is

managed through a combination of gear restrictions, 21
22
seasonal limits,
culling requirements, 23 pollution
24
25
closures,
entry restrictions,
and repletion programs.

It is difficult to describe the nature of

these restrictions and limitations because they come

\',

together in a variety of permutations and combinations
with manifold exemptions and exclusions.
however:

Generally,

the taking of oysters under sail power and

with hand operated tongs is encouraged while the taking
of oysters under motor power or with a dredge is r~,
stricted; taking of oysters during the summer months
is prohibited; oysters smaller than three inches
across must be culled and returned to the beds; public
health officials have authority to close oyster bars
when there is a danger of contamination; and each
state limits entry to their respective citizens, while
Potomac waters are open to the citizens of both states
to the exclusion of all others.
It is somewhat easier to generalize the_ c_on9-eq1:1_en.,ces

of these regulations.

They have not increased the
6
2
physical yiel~-- of' the f_~sh~;t"Y.
In Virginia, state-

.

··-·

wide oyster production declined from over 3.5 million
bushels annually just prior to 1960 to about one
million bushels in 1977; 27 on the Potomac production
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dropped from 146,846 bushels in the production year
ending in 1964 (7/1/63 to 6/30/64) to 29,508 bushels
in the production year ending in 1977, only to rebound
to 166,282 bushels in the production year ending in

1978; 28 in Maryland 1,635,123 bushels were harvested
in 1960, while 1,851,564 bushels were harvested in
1977. 29 Credit for the upsurge in the Potomac yield
and jor the sustenance of the Maryland yield is
generally extended to the oyster repletion programs
30
which these jurisdictions conduct.
These programs,
which involve the rebuilding and reseeding of public
oyster bars, in 1977 cost over $200,000 in Potomac
waters, and over one million dollars in Maryland
waters. 31
Chesapeake oyster laws have had other consequences.
They have foreclosed the use of modern gear such as
,

~wer operated dredges which would permit the taking
/

of oysters at a significantly lower cost.

They have

created a parochial preference for the citizens of
respective states, but by so doing, may have interfered with development of mutually advantageous tradeoffs between Maryland and Virginia in waters other
than the Potomac's.

Finally, (and, serendipitously)

they have preserved a remnant of the pictur~sque
maritime heritage of classic bay vessels--but for the
oyster laws, skipjacks and bugeyes wohld have. long
since been extinct.
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Part II
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
The Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery relies principally
on the cultivation of public oyster bars.

As was

discussed above, these bars are regulated through a
variety of measures intended to conserve the resource,
including entry restrictions.

A recent Supreme Court

d~cision raises substantial questions over the legitimacy of laws in Maryland and Virginia which exclude
nonresident oystermen.

While at present, Maryland

watermen are restricted to Maryland waters and Virginians are restricted to Virginia and Potomac River
waters, the Supreme Court's ruling in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,

32

strongly suggests that a

-,-

mobile, interstate connnercial oyster fleet will eventually ply the waters of the Chesapeake Bay without
regard to state boundaries.
The specific conflict presented in the Douglas case
arose when the Commissioner of Virginia Marine Resources refused to issue a license which would allow
Seacoast Products, Inc. to catch menhaden in Virginia's
territorial waters.

The reason for his refusal was

that under two provisions of state law, the nonresident company was ineligible for commercial fishing
licenses.

Section 21.1-60 of the Virginia Code pro-

hibited persons other than Virginia residents ("any
person who has actually resided in Virginia for
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twelve months") from fishing for menhaden in the Virginia portion of the Chesapeake Bay. 33 However, nonresident corporations were eligible for menhaden
licenses to fish in the three mile wide marginal sea
along Virginia's eastern coast if United States citizens owned and controlled at least seventy-five percent of its stock.

Seacoast Products was founded in

1911,, incorporated in Delaware, maintaining its principal offices in New Jersey and qualified to do business in Virginia.

34 In 1973 Seacoast was sold to

Hanson Trust Limited, a British company, the stock of
which is held almost entirely by aliens. 35

Because

Seacoast was no longer owned by United States citizens,
it was prohibited under Virginia law from fishing for
menhaden in the Bay, as well as in the marginal sea.
Seacoast then filed a complaint in federal court
challenging the constitutionality of the Virginia statutes.

A three judge court was convened which agreed

with Seacoast's contention that "since the licenses
are granted to Virginia domestic and resident corporations but refused nonresident corporations, there is
discrimination in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment assurance of equal protection of the laws. 136
The state of Virginia appealed that ruling to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision, but on
another ground.

The Court stated that it was unneces-

sary to reach the constitutional questions raised by
the parties, since it found that the two Virginia
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statutes were preempted by federal vessel enrollment
and licensing laws. 37 Since Seacoast's vessels had
been properly enrolled and since they had been
licensed to catch any type of fish, "we conclude that
[they] had been granted the right to fish in Virginia
waters on the same terms as Virginia residents. 1138
The principal authority for this conclusion, aside
from the licensing statutes and the prescribed form
of the license itself, was the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 39 decided in 1824.

In that case the court

ruled that a New York statue creating a steamboat
monopoly in New York waters was preempted by the
federal laws under which a would be competitor had
enrolled and licensed his vessel.

Since Gibbons'

steamboat was federally licensed to engage in the
coasting trade, the court held that the license not
only ·identified the national character of the vessel,
but also conveyed the right to transport passengers
and freight in coastal waters free from state-created
monopolies.

The Douglas decision reasoned that since

Seacoast held licenses for the mackeral fishery,
which is defined to include "the taking of fish of
every description",

40 it not only identified the

enterprise pursued, but also authorized Seacoast to
carry on that enterprise:
"And just as Gibbons and its progeny found a
grant of the right to trade in a State without
discrimination, we conclude that [Seacoast's
vessels] have been granted the right to fish

2

4

in Virginia waters on the same terms as Virginia residents. 11 41
The ruling in the Douglas decision more or less
compels the conclusion that a federal vessel licence
entitles a nonresident to harvest oysters (as well as
finfish) on the same terms as residents.

The form of

the license, as prescribed by statute, states that a
license to engage in the mackeral fishery authorizes
"the'taking of fish of every description including
shellfish.

1142 Records of the Coast Guard offices in

the Chesapeake Bay region show a total of 2,491
federally licensed fishing vessels, 1,786 engaged in
fishing generally and 705 principally engaged in

oystering. 43

There is also, of course, the possibility

that the removal of state entry restrictions may
attract to the Chesapeake Bay federally licensed fishing vessels from other regions.

Hence, Douglas has

the immediate impact of removing residency limitations
on access to Chesapeake Bay for thousands of vessels.
An interesting question is the extent to which the
Douglas decision may encourage application for federal
licenses.

The federal enrollment and licensing laws

only require licensing of vessels displacing over
five tons;

44

many traditional Chesapeake Bay workboats

displace less than five tons.

The Douglas ruling

provides an incentive to the operatorsI of such, boats
(whether Maryland or Virginia) to obtain a license,
and to thereby obtain access to the whole Bay.

2

Whether vessels displacing less than five tons are
eligible for federal licenses is problematic.
A second interesting question is whether the
Douglas ruling renders Maryland's and Virginia's residency requirements unconstitutional.

Although decid-

ing the case on the narrow grounds of preemption, the
Court went on to say:
"A number of coastal States have discriminatory
fisheries laws, and with all natural resources
becoming increasingly scarce and more valuable,
more and more such restrictions would be a likely
prospect, as both protective and retaliatory
measures. Each State's fishermen eventually
might be effectively limited to working in the
territorial waters of their residence, or in
the federally controlled fishery beyond the
three mile limit. Such proliferation of residency requirements for commercial fishermen
•.,i.
would create exactly the sort of Balkanization
of interstate commercial activity which the
Constitution was intended to prevent. 114 5
This view of the respective state and federal interests suggests that the Supreme Court would not be
reluctant to extend the holding in Douglas to preclude state residency requirements for oystermen,
The possibility that state access restrictions on
the Chesapeake oyster fishery may be struck down as
unconstitutional is reinforced by a Supreme Court
decision handed down several months after Douglas,
in the case of Hicklin v. O;beck.

46

An Alaska sta-

tute required that every oil and gas lease to which
the state is a party must contain terms assuring the
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hiring of qualified Alaska residents in preference to
nonresidents.

When nonresidents challenged the con-

stitutionality of the "Alaska Hire" law, the state
argued that its ownership of oil and gas reserves was
a sufficient justification for confining the benefits
of exploiting those resources to state residents.
The Supreme Court disagreed:
"Although the fact that a state owned resource
is tlestined for interstate commerce does not,
of itself, disable the State from preferring
its own citizens in the utilization of that resource, it does inform analysis under the Privileges and Immunities Clause as to the permissibility of the discrimination the State visits
upon nonresidents based on its ownership of the
resource. Here the oil and gas upon which Alaska
hinges its discrimination against nonresidents
are of profound national importance. On the other
hand the breadth of the discrimination mandated
by Alaska Hire goes far beyond the degree of resident bias Alaska's ownership of the oil and
gas can justifiably support. The confluence
of these realities points to but one conclusion:
Alaska Hire cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny. As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed in
Baldwin v.G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935),
the Constitution "was framed" upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink
or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division." 47
As the Douglas decision revealed, the Court recognized
the commercial fisheries of the coastal states as important components of the nation's intetstate commerce.
Therefore, the residency discriminations of the Chesapeake oyster fishery are no less likely to withstand
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constitutional scrutiny than Alaska's attempted preferment of residents in developing its oil and gas
resources.
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Part III
THE FUTURE OF THE CHESAPEAKE OYSTER FISHERY
The preceding analysis presents the real possibility
that Chesapeake Bay oysters will in the future be
harvested by a mobile interstate work force.

Fortu-

nately, there is an instructive and analogous precedent ~o the elimination of state residency restrictions which the Douglas decision forebodes.

That pre-

cedent is the elimination of county residency restrictions on Maryland commercial shellfish harvesters as

/a

result of the state court ruling in Bruce v. Direc-

tor, Department of Chesapeake Bay Affa~n 1971.

48

Prior to the Bruce case, Maryland law prohibited a
waterman from taking oysters with hand tongs or
patent tongs in waters outside the county in which he
resided.

Similar restraints applied to crabbers.

The

Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that these statutes
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 23 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Maryland Constitution:
"We think the statues set fourth an unlawful
classification of persons and discriminate
not only among the several watermen of the
13 tidewater counties in which crabs and oysters
are found in marketable quantities, but also
between residents of these counties and those
who reside in Baltimore City and the: 10 remaining counties of Maryland. In addition, we cannot see in what way the restrictive nature of
the statutory provisions bears any reasonable
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relation to the public interest. 1149
As a result of this ruling, Maryland watermen have
been allowed to harvest oysters throughout the state
without regard to boundaries.

The considerations

which influence a waterman's decision to seek shellfish
outside his own county waters are similar to those
which would influence watermen to cross state lines if
residency requirements were eliminated.

In addition,

the effects of the increase in mobility since the
Bruce decision should demonstrate, on a somewhat
smaller scale, what might be expected to result if
watermen were permitted to move freely through the
Maryland and Virginia portions of the Chesapeake Bay.
Thus, an understanding of changes in the Maryland

-.~

oyster industry in the years since the Bruce decision
should assist fisheries managers in anticipating the
consequences of an elimination of state residency requirements.
The elimination of the county residency requirement has had significant impacts on Maryland's oystermen.

These impacts were analyzed by Dr. Ivar Strand,

a University of Maryland resource economist, in a
50
recently completed Sea Grant study.
Prior to the
Bruce decision, oyster densities (as measured by
average productivity per boat day) varied widely
from county to county.

Oyster bars in certain coun-

ties yielded over twice the harvest per boat day obtained in other counties.

In the period after the
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Bruce decision, presumably as a result of the transfer
of fishing effort, oyster densities rapidly equalized
throughout the state.

Once watermen were no longer

restricted to the waters of the home county, they
found it profitable to motor to distant bars despite
the additional costs in terms of fuel and traveling
time.
A correlative change occurred in the pattern of
•
prices for landed oysters among the counties. Prior
to the Bruce decision, prices among counties varied
widely and randomly.

No one county's price was con-

sistently the highest.

Random events such as good

spatfall or the opening of closed shellfish areas
would change the oyster density in one county,
creating large supplies, and generating low prices
for several years.

Fishing effort could not be

rapidly shifted to take advantage of the higher yields
so as to increase landings and depress prices.
After 197l, a much more stable and predictable
/2attern of county oyster price~ emerged.

As would

be expected, all other things being equal, oysters
landed in the county closest to the principal marketing center brought the highest price since the
wholesaler's shipping costs were less.

During this

period oyster densities have remained relatively
equal among the counties, as discussed,above.
The basic differences in the Maryland and Virginia
oyster fisheries must be kept in mind to protect
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properly the lessons of Maryland's experiences with
intercounty mobility to an interstate Chesapeake Bay
oystery.

Thorough studies of the respective state
oyster programs have been made, 51 but the essential

characteristics may be digested as follows:
1.

the average productivity of public oyster

grounds in Virginia is considered to be lower than in
Maryland; 52
2.

private oyster leases in Virginia cover about

ten times the area leased in Maryland; 53 and

3.

there are over two thousand federally licensed

fishermen around the Bay, seven hundred of whom are
.
.
. oys t ering.
.
54
principally
engage d in

It would appear that some portion of the licensed
....
Virginia watermen would have an incentive for entering Maryland waters to oyster, to the extent that the
greater returns for a given amount of effort offset
transit costs.

Just as the elimination of county

residency requirements resulted in an equalization
in oyster densities among the counties, the elimination of state residency requirements permits a transfer of effort by Virginians to the more productive
Maryland oyster bars.

Since the transfer of effort

will initially be toward Maryland, Virginia oysters
will be spared in the short run.

An equilibrium in

regional densities should be rapidly achieved, as in
the post-Bruce period, after which the concentration
of effort will be ·drawn toward particular areas of
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greater abundance (as determined by a good spatfall,
seeding efforts or the opening of previously closed
shellfish grounds) and away from poorer, less productive grounds (which may be affected by disease, pollution, predators, ice or other problems).
Interstate mobility will exacerbate the tendency of
the individual waterman to place a higher priority on
/imme~iate returns rather than on long-term productivity
of the public bars.

In the case of a private leased

bed, the lessee has the greatest incentive to adopt
management practices oriented toward conservation and
l~ng-term productivity. 55

He has the greatest incen-

tive to defer present harvesting to assure future
propagation.

During the period prior to the Bruce

decision, each waterman shared the oyster grounds of
his county only with other county residents.

The re-

source was not exclusive, but within this limited
"commons" it is possible that a waterman could still
view deferred production as being within his economic

/

self-interest.

However, as these bars are opened to

all state residents, and eventually to any waterman
at all, the economic incentive of the individual to
maximize innnediate gains from the available oyster
resources must take greater precedence.
Even after densities in each state have become
equalized due to interstate mobility df oystermen,
the Virginia oyster industry as a whole will be less
vulnerable to the effects of a shifting oyster fleet.
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This mobility would only affect public bars:

a far

greater part of the Virginia industry than the Maryland industry depends upon the use of privately leased
oyster grounds.

It is unlikely that nonresidents would

claim right to immediately disenfranchise private
leaseholders.

Thus, the infiltration of nonresidents

into the privately leased grounds in Virginia will
be controlled by the manner prescribed by state law
for applying for the right to lease a given tract.

56

In each state private leases are presently limited to
residents; 57

these restrictions appear to be as vul-

nerable to constitutional challenge as the general
ban on nonresident oystermen.

The state, as lessor

of real property, is not immune to the reQuirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment 58 or the Commerce Cla;~e
any more than as regulator of fisheries within state
waters.
The duration of individual private leases, twenty
years in both Maryland and Virginia, would slow the\/
influx of newcomers even if nonresidents did become
eligible.

Further delay would result from laws which

gave preference to existing leaseholders for the
right to renew their leases.

Such a preference has

some justification as a sound conservation measure
since the lessee would be encouraged to employ practices likely to result in the greatest long-term
yield.

If the right to renew were assured, the

lessee would not be inclined to deplete his oyster
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beds at the end of the lease period.

While the wide-

spread use of long-term, renewable private oyster
leases in a state's management program would serve to
buffer the impacts resulting from nonresident fishermen, it would also perpetuate the exclusion of nonresidents.

In other circumstances, limited entry

schemes which allowed preferences to prior holders of
fishing licenses, have been declared unconstitutional
where 'the effect was to exclude nonresidents. 59 However, the need for continuity in oyster leases may be
found to justify the discriminatory effects.

60

Maryland currently subsidizes its oyster repletion
program at a cost of half a million dollars per year,
in addition to revenues generated by inspection and
severance taxes. 61

When the benefits of the reple-

tion program are no longer confined to state residents,
political support for continuing the subsidy will decline.

If the repletion program is essential for the

maintenance of productivity on public bars, then
oyster taxes would have to be increased until sufficient revenues are generated to fund the entire program without subsidization.

Note that even when

taxes are raised to the point where the costs of the
repletion program are covered, the state receives no
net benefit in exchange for oysters harvested.
With the elimination of state reside~cy requirements for oystermen, the states of Maryland and
Virginia would have an unprecedented need for the
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development of a joint management program.

The Poto-

mac River Fisheries Compact, which provides for joint
management of one river, could provide a model for an
enlarged Chesapeake Bay oyster management scheme.
The coastal zone management plans currently under
development in both states should be modified to
accommodate the need for greater cooperation in fisheries management as state residency restrictions are
eliminated.
In summary, the Maryland and Virginia oyster industries, like the fisheries in many coastal states,
stand in a precarious position as a result of the
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. decision.

Without

the insulation provided by state residency restric-._,
tions, public oyster bars will be exposed to more
intensive fishing effort.

The state should plan now

to restructure its oyster management prograrnto_ P:?tect its property interest in state oyster grounds,
to avoid subsidizing nonresident oystermen out of
______ .,, ---- .....
general state revenues and.to-·enco~age more widespread cultivation of privately leased oyster beds.
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Part IV
INTRODUCTION OF EXOTIC SPECIES
The preceding section concluded that it was in the
interest of Maryland and Virginia to encourage more
widespread cultivation of privately leased oyster
..
beds .

-- ------------

.,.......One, aspect of increased private oyster culture must
be the examination of possible advantages of different
species of oyster such as Crassostrea ~ introduction of Crassostrea

~

The

into the Chesapeake

Bay would be hampered by a number of legal constraints.
In Maryland a state law provides that "[a] lessee may
plant, cultivate, sow, or protect oysters only of the
/species known as Crassostrea virginica in waters of
the state. 1162 This measure was passed to curb some
rather haphazard experimentation by a local shellfish
entrepreneur.

Maryland law is not as explicit on the

question of whether the state is authorized to plant
a new species.

Although the state Department of

Natural Resources is directed generally to "take measures which in its judgment seem best calculated to
increase the productivity or utility of any part of
the natural oyster bars of the state, 1163 the specific
provisions dealing with the repletion program appear
to authorize only intrastate movement Q'f seed, othe:r
oysters and cultch.

64

The Potomac River Fisheries Commission has no

28

specific regulation concerning the introduction of new
species.

Therefore, the Maryland laws prohibiting

importation of

&

new species would apply on the Potomac

River as we11. 65
The Commonwealth of Virginia has recently enacted a
comprehensive statute to regulate the introduction of
66
fish and shellfish imported from outside the state.
Under this statute, the Commissioner of Marine
Resources, with the concurrence of the Director of the
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, is authorized to
establish a list of approved states or waters in the
continental United States from which approved species
of fish and shellfish may be imported.

If a proposed

~-

import is not an approved species from an approved

area in the United States, specific permission must

be obtained from the Commission prior to importation.
It appears, therefore, that the introduction of a
new species of oyster must be preceded by statutory
changes in Maryland and, assuming Maryland wouid
adopt a law similar to that enacted in Virginia, regulatory review and approval by state fisheries agencies.

What criteria should these agencies apply?

The original list of species permitted for importation into Virginia is left entirely to the discretion of the Commissioner of Marine Resources, subject
to the veto of the Director of the Virginia Institute
of Marine Resources.

A species may be added t6 or

removed from the list of approved species when the

288

Commissioner "deems it necessary for the protection of
the waters of the Commonwealth. 1167 While such a standard may be applicable when considering the deletion
of a species from the list, it hardly seems appropriate for determining when to allow the importation
of a new species.

Such an importation would rarely

be necessary for the protection of state waters.
The state of Washington, which has had more experience ~ith oyster seed importation, has adopted a comparable statute to regulate such imports.

68 Each

shipment must be inspected and may be excluded from
planting unless the state fisheries officials find
that "the seed in question has been found to be free
'
of disease, infestation,
pests and other substances

which might endanger the oysters in the waters of
this state."

This regulation does not specifically

address the question of the introduction of a new
species.

Possibly it was enacted after the importa-

tion of Japanese .Q_. gigas seed had become an established practice to guard against the ancillary perils,
rather than in response to the central question of
species establishment and competition.
Plainly the lawmakers in oyster growing areas have
not dealt with this problem adequately.

It is diffi-

cult to dispute the need for careful state regulation

---·----··--

---···

of the introductions of new shellfish s1pecies, .but

the guidelines or criteria for determining whether a
-

>

new species should be introduced must be established
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based upon
the current state of···-··scientific
knowledge
--_____ .,_
. . -- -------····--

··•

,.,

of the possible risks and benefits presented.
""-"-·----

·····--___..

---

While governmental regulation appears to be necessary, it does not answer or resolve all the legal
uncertainties presented by the introduction of a new
species.

Let us assume that both Maryland and Virginia

approve the introduction of Crassostrea gigas.

One

enterprising leaseholder then decides to invest in a
shipment of Japanese seed for planting on several
hundred acres of his private grounds, hoping for faster
growth rates, greater resistance to pests, diseases
and salinity variances, or more reliable reproduction
than he had been able to obtain with Crassostrea virginica.

We can further assume that a shipment of
•. /.

seed arrives, is inspected for pests and diseases,
and is cleared for distribution on a large leased
area along the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay.
By

his venture, this entrepreneur has created a

number of risks of economic loss to watermen dependent
upon public oyster bars and to lessees of other private oyster leases using Crassostrea virginica.

One

obvious hazard is the possibility of bringing in an
oyster predator or disease.

One of the most destruc-

tive pests in the Puget Sound area is an oriental
species of oyster drill, Tritonalia japonica, which

was accidentally imported. 69

The spread of the

fungus Dermocystidium marinum and the microparasite
MSX is believed to have been tied to oyster

2'90

transplantations. 70

Is it possible to inspect a ship-

ment of seed oysters so thoroughly as to eliminate any
possibility of a disease or pest infestation?

If not,

they present a substantial risk of damage beyond the
boundaries of the entrepreneur's leased ground.
A second area of risk is escape.

Although at first

blush, the idea of escaping oysters seems like a ludicrous concern, the reproductive process admits the
,
possibility of spatfall from the introduced species
several miles from the planting location.

Tidal cur-

rent velocities in the Bay vary from nearly zero to
over two knots,

71

and .Q_.

~

larvae could well be

swept to the beds of .Q_. virginica under cultivation on
other leased or public grounds.

There is no way to

prevent such an occurrence in open water culture and
the only restraint on this spreading would be the
inability of the introduced species to reproduce and
thrive in the host waters.

Once introduced into exist-

ing .Q_. virginica beds, it is conceivable that a new
species could become more abundant.
stitute potential economic loss?

Would this con-

The answer depends

on the relative desirability and marketability of the
two species.

If the new species is inferior in taste

or market acceptability, the leaseholder or waterman
will suffer a loss equal to the decrease in revenues
caused by the lesser quality of much of his harvest.
This loss may be offset by an increase in production,
if such an increase occurs.
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Existing legal institutions are not likely to provide a ready solution to the problem of shifting economic losses occasioned by the introduction of a new
oyster species.

An oyster planter who suffers such a

loss could bring a lawsuit under one of several legal
theories:

nuisance, trespass or negligence theories
are among the most likely to be employed. 72 However,

the litigants would face substantial practical difficulties in proving that a loss resulted from a specific
importation by a specific defendant.

Quantifying dam-

ages could be a wildly speculative exercise where harvests and prices are constantly changing, and where
heavy rainfalls or winter icing might decimate the
oyster population on a given bar.

It may be poss~qle

to prevail in a case if the importation occurred only
one time and if the damage could be positively linked
to that importation.

Some leaseholders may be able

to establish the value of an annual harvest by careful
record keeping so that, assuming no other significant
variables, the loss resulting from someone else's
importation of a new species could be ~uantified within
reasonable limits.

Nonetheless, the costs in legal

fees, expert witness fees and court costs could easily
be expected to exceed $10,000.

Since there is no

administrative forum in which such claims could be
adjudicated, a damaged planter would be forced to
simply absorb his losses or face an expensive court
process with little certainty to the outcome.
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All this points to the necessity of proceeding with
caution in the introduction of a new species in an
area, like the Chesapeake Bay, which supports an existfog oyster fishery Usirig a native species.

Ultima:teiy,

administrative agencies must make the difficult decision to allow or to prohibit an importation.

But these

agencies and the legislatures which must authorize the
agenc~es to make such decisions must look to the
scientific connnunity to determine with some certainty
the likely consequences attending the introduction of
a .new species.

Our legal institutions can prevent an

importation, regulate the manner of importation or.
even adjust the claims of those who are damaged, but
they are powerless to restore the biological integrity
of the Bay once the decision has been made to introduce
a new species.

\
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DISCUSSION
Nelson:

Under the Douglas case, federally registered

boats could not be excluded from fishing.

This is for

boats of greater than 5 tons displacements.

How does

this legislation relate to vessels of less than 5 tons
displacement?
Lewis:

I think that the principles underlying the

Douglas decision, aside from the narrow question of
•
vessel registration, still apply to the unregistered
fishermen and their boats.
Power:

It seems relevant to ask whether or not the

owner of a vessel of under 5 tons displacement could
successfully apply for and obtain a federal registration for that vessel.
Blogaslowski:

I own a vessel of less than 5 tons and

did apply for federal registration.

I was told that

due to its size, the vessel could not be federally registered.
Shaw:

I did not challenge the decision.

In the case of Maryland about $1,000,000 per

year of state tax money is invested in maintaining the
oyster bars in state waters.

Thus, it could be said

that Maryland manages its oyster fishery whereas the
Menhaden Fisheries are essentially unmanaged at the
state level.

Does this investment of state money by

Maryland not allow it certain jurisdiction over the
exploitation of the Oyster Fishery?

I

~
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Lewis:

I don't think that you can avoid the princi-

ples that the United States are a "common market" by
investing state money in a resource.
Haskins:

Is there sufficient flexibility within the

federalism concept to allow for differential licensing
fees for residents and nonresidents based upon the
financial input of the state to maintaining the fishery?
Power:

This argument could be made .!_£,you could de-

monstrate a good relationship between the magnitude
of the state subsidy and the differential in the
license fee.
Nelson:

A comment, I believe, that the productj~j.~y

of the private leases in Maryland is approximately
four times that of public bars despite the fact that
the latter are generally on superior bottom.

---·--·-··•··--•.-•·-·· ................. .........,-- .,·-·····-·----·-,

Power:
Andrews:

.

That is a good point of emphasis.
This may not all be a one way street in

favor of Virginia in that Maryland is generally short
of seed oysters and would be able to collect seed in
the James River, VA area.
Power:

There is another, as yet unchallenged, discri-

mination in the Maryland oyster laws which excludes
corporations from participating in the oyster business.
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I think that this is unconstitutional.

It is ob-

viously a significant discouragement to bringing modern technology to the Bay.
Lipovsky:

I would just like to comment that in Wash-

ington state, about 80-90% of the oyster harvest is
collected by hydraulic or mechanical dredge.

This

does not appear to have resulted in any detrimental
effect on the fishery.

In fact, there is some ques-

tion as to whether or not tilling an oyster bed with
a bagless dredge is in fact beneficial.
Lewis:
Chew:

Virginia also allows such dredging.
In the state of Washington, there are hearings

pending, relating to the use of escalator dredges"for
clams and goeducks.

If the decisions are made in

favor of the local residents and environmentalists,
and against the fishermen, there are some definite
negative implications to the future use of dredges for
the oyster industry.
Nelson:

In New England, I think it is fair to say, we

would have no oyster industry were it not for the
mechanical dredge.

~

